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Grandparents and Other Third Parties
(Suit Affecting the Parent Child Relationship)

Step Parents

A. Statute
The provision for Step-Parent standing is found in Texas Family Code section 102.003(a)(11). An "Grandparents And Other Third Parties Chapter 22 7" original suit may be filed at any time by a person with whom the child and the child's guardian, managing conservator, or parent have resided for at least six months ending not more than 90 days preceding the date of the filing of the petition if the child's guardian, managing conservator, or parent is deceased at the time of the filing of the petition.

B. Cases
1. Doncer v. Dickerson, 81 S.W.3d 349 (Tex.App-El Paso 2002, no pet.). This suit involved a SAPCR brought by a stepmother for possessory conservatorship of a six year old boy following the death of the child's father. After the death of the father, the mother cut off all contact. The evidence showed that in some years the child was in the stepmother's care 51% of the time and in some years 48% of the time.

The trial court found that the joint managing conservatorship resulted in the child living with the father and stepmother nearly, but less than half of the time, and so found that the stepmother never had actual care, control and possession of the child for a period of six months and dismissed the suit for lack of standing. The court of appeals was then faced with deciding whether the "principle residence" as used in Tex.Fam.Code §102.003(b) to compute the time necessary for standing, carried the same connotation as "primary residence" as used in Tex.Fam.Code §153.134(b)(1) in rendering an order appointing joint managing conservators, the court shall designate the conservator who has the exclusive right to determine the primary residence of the child. The court found that the phraseology carried different connotations, and so reversed and remanded the case.

The court reiterated that the six months' possession need not be continuous and uninterrupted, but rather, the court should look at the child's principal residence during that time frame and defined "principle residence" as "a fixed place of abode occupied consistently over a substantial period of time which is permanent, rather than temporary." Doncer v. Dickerson, 81 S.W.3d 349 at 362. The court then goes on to say that a standard possession order would not automatically confer standing, but that the cases must be decided on a case by case basis. Based on the facts in this case, the court found that the stepmother had standing.